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an agent, assuming perfect knowledge of its static oppo-nent. However, such strategies are brittle: against a worstcase opponent, they have a high exploitability. In a two- The problem of exploiting information about the player zero-sum game, a Nash equilibrium strategy maxi- environment while still being robust to inaccu- mizes its utility against a worst-case opponent. As a result, rate or incomplete information arises in many we say that such strategies are robust. If a perfect model of the opponent is available, then they can be exploited by games where the goal is to maximally exploit an a best response; if a model is not available, then playing a unknown opponent’s weaknesses are an example Nash equilibrium strategy is a sensible choice. However, of this problem. Agents for these games must if a model exists but it is somewhat unreliable (e.g., if it is balance two objectives. First, they should aim to formed from a limited number of observations of the oppo- exploit data from past interactions with the op- nent’s actions, or if the opponent is known to be changing ponent, seeking a best-response counter strategy.
strategies) then a better option may be to compromise: ac- Second, they should aim to minimize losses since cepting a slightly lower worst-case utility in return for a the limited data may be misleading or the oppo- higher utility if the model is approximately correct.
nent’s strategy may have changed, suggesting anopponent-agnostic Nash equilibrium strategy. In One simple approach for creating such a compromise strat- this paper, we show how to partially satisfy both egy is to create both a best response strategy and a Nash of these objectives at the same time, producing equilibrium strategy, and then play a mixture of the two.
strategies with favourable tradeoffs between the Before each game, we will flip a biased coin. With prob- ability to exploit an opponent and the capacity ability p we will use the best response, and with probabil- to be exploited. Like a recently published tech- ity (1 − p) we will use the Nash equilibrium. By varying nique, our approach involves solving a modified p, we can create a range of strategies that linearly trade game; however the result is more generally appli- off exploitation of the opponent and our own exploitability cable and even performs well in situations with by a worst-case opponent. While this approach is a useful very limited data. We evaluate our technique in baseline, we would like to make more favourable tradeoffs the game of two-player, Limit Texas Hold’em.
McCracken and Bowling [McCracken and Bowling, 2004]proposed -safe strategies as another approach. The set of -safe strategies contains all strategies that are exploitable by no more than . From this set, the strategies that maxi- Maximizing utility in the presence of other agents is a fun- mize utility against the opponent are the set of -safe best damental problem in game theory. In a zero-sum game, responses. Thus, for a chosen , the set of -safe best utility comes from the exploitation of opponent weak- responses achieve the best possible tradeoffs between ex- nesses, but it is important not to allow one’s own strategy to ploitation and exploitability. However, their approach is be exploited in turn. Two approaches to such problems are computationally infeasible for large domains, and has only well known: best response strategies and Nash equilibrium been applied to Ro-Sham-Bo (Rock-Paper-Scissors).
strategies. A best response strategy maximizes utility for Appearing in Proceedings of the 12th International Confe-rence In previous work we proposed the restricted Nash re- on Artificial Intelligence and Statistics (AISTATS) 2009, Clearwa- sponse [Johanson et al., 2008] technique (RNR) as a prac- ter Beach, Florida, USA. Volume 5 of JMLR: W&CP 5. Copyright tical approach for generating a range of strategies that pro- vide good tradeoffs between exploitation and exploitabil- ity. In this approach, a modified game is formed in which best response to an opponent’s strategy σ2 is a strategy for the opponent is forced to act according to an opponent player 1 that achieves the maximum expected utility of all model with some probability p, and is free to play the strategies when used against the opponent’s strategy. There game as normal with probability (1 − p). When p is 0 can be many strategies that achieve the same expected util- the result is a Nash equilibrium, and when p is 1 the re- ity; we refer to the set of best responses as BR(σ2) ⊆ Σ1.
sult is a best response. When 0 < p < 1 the technique For example, the set of best responses for player 1 to use produces a counter-strategy that provides different trade- offs between exploitation and exploitability. In fact, the counter-strategies generated are in the set of -safe best re- sponses for the counter-strategy’s value of , making themthe best possible counter-strategies, assuming the model is A strategy profile σ consists of a strategy for each player correct. In a practical setting, however, the model is likely formed through a limited number of observations of the op- σ1 ∈ BR(σ2) and σ2 ∈ BR(σ1), we refer to σ as a Nash ponent’s actions, and it may be incomplete (it cannot pre- equilibrium. A zero-sum extensive game is an extensive dict the opponent’s strategy in some states) or inaccurate.
game where u1 = −u2 (one player’s gains are equal to As we will show in this paper, the restricted Nash response the other player’s losses). In such games, all Nash equilib- technique can perform poorly under such circumstances.
rium strategies have the same utility for the players, and werefer to this as the value of the game. We define the term In this paper, we present a new technique for generat- exploitability to refer to the difference between a strategy’s ing a range of counter-strategies that form a compromise utility when playing against its best-response and the value between the exploitation of a model and its exploitabil- of the game for that player. We define exploitation to re- ity. These counter-strategies, called data biased responses fer to the difference in utility between one strategy’s utility (DBR), are more resilient to incomplete or inaccurate against a specific opponent strategy and the value of the models than the restricted Nash response (RNR) counter- strategies. DBR is similar to RNR in that the technique in-volves computing a Nash equilibrium strategy in a modified A strategy that can be exploited for no more than game where the opponent is forced with some probability called -safe, and is a member of the set of -safe strate- to play according to a model. Unlike RNR, the opponent’s strategy is constrained on a per-information set basis, and depends on our confidence in the accuracy of the model.
For comparison to the RNR technique, we demonstrate the effectiveness of the technique in the challenging domain of 2-player Limit Texas Hold’em Poker.
A perfect information extensive game consists of a treeof game states and terminal nodes. At each game state, an Heads-Up Limit Texas Hold’em poker is a two-player action is taken by one player (or by “chance”) causing a transition to a child state; this is repeated until a terminal played in casinos (both online and in real life), it is also state is reached. The terminal state defines the payoffs to the main event of the AAAI Computer Poker Competi- the players. In imperfect information extensive games tion [Zinkevich and Littman, 2006], an initiative to foster such as poker, the players cannot observe some piece of in- research into AI for imperfect information games. Texas formation (such as their opponent’s cards) and so they can- Hold’em is a very large zero-sum extensive form game not exactly determine which game state they are in. Each with imperfect information (the opponent’s cards are hid- set of indistinguishable game states is called an informa- den) and stochastic elements (cards are dealt at random).
tion set and we denote such a set by I ∈ I. A strategy for Each individual game is short, and players typically play a player i, σi, is a mapping from information sets to a proba- bility distribution over actions, so σi(I, a) is the probability We will briefly summarize the rules of the game. A ses- player i takes action a in information set I. The space of all sion starts with each player having some number of chips, possible strategies for player i will be denoted Σi. In this which usually represent money. A single game of Heads- paper, we will focus on two player games.
Up Limit Texas Hold’em consists of each player being Given strategies for both players, we define ui(σ1, σ2) to forced to place a small number of chips (called a blind) be the expected utility for player i if player 1 uses the strat- into the pot before being dealt two private cards. The play- egy σ1 ∈ Σ1 and player 2 uses the strategy σ2 ∈ Σ2. A ers will combine these private cards with five public cards that are revealed as the game progresses. The game has Nash equilibria in a game of this size is intractable. There- four phases: the preflop (when two private cards are dealt), fore, it is common practise to instead reduce the real game the flop (when three public cards are dealt), the turn (when to a much smaller abstract game that maintains as many of one public card is dealt) and the river (when one final pub- the strategic properties as possible. The strategies of inter- lic card is dealt). If both players reach the end of the game est to us will be computed in this abstract game. To use the (called a showdown), then both players reveal their private abstract game strategy to play the real game, we will map cards and the player with the best 5-card poker hand wins the current real game information set to an abstract game all of the chips in the pot. If only one player remains in the information set, and choose the action specified by the ab- game, then that player wins the pot without revealing their cards. After the cards are dealt in each phase, the players The game is abstracted by merging information sets that engage in a round of betting, where they bet by placing result from similar chance outcomes. On the preflop, one additional chips in the pot that their opponent must match such abstraction might reduce the number of chance out- or exceed in order to remain in the game. To do this, the comes from 52 choose 2 down to 5, and from (52 choose players alternate turns and take one of three actions. They may fold to exit the game and let the opponent win, call to come is reduced to one of 5 outcomes, giving 625 possi- match the opponent’s chips in the pot, or raise to match, ble combinations, resulting in a game that has 6.45 × 109 and then add a fixed number of additional chips (the “bet” game states. In this abstract game, best response counter- amount). When both players have called, the round of bet- strategies can be computed in time linear in the size of ting is over, and no more than four bets are allowed in a the game tree; on modern hardware, this takes roughly 10 minutes. Using recent advances for solving extensive form The goal is to win as much money as possible from the op- games [Zinkevich et al., 2008], a Nash equilibrium for this ponent by the end of the session. This distinguishes poker abstract game can be approximated to within 3 millibets from games such as Chess or Checkers where the goal is simply to win and the magnitude of the win is not mea-sured. The performance of an agent is measured by the number of bet amounts (or just bets) they win per game towards creating strong agents for Texas Hold’em across a session. Between strong computer agents, this number can be small, so we present the performance in mil- libets per game (mb/g), where a millibet is one thousandth of a bet. A player that always folds will lose 750 millibets the ability to exploit opponent weaknesses, so we will per game to their opponent, and a strong player can hope examine results where the opponent is not playing an to win 50 millibets per game from their opponent. Due to equilibrium strategy. Toward this end, we created an agent a standard deviation of approximately 6000 millibets per similar to “Orange”, which was designed to be overly game, it can take more than one million games to distin- aggressive but still near equilibrium and competed in the guish with 95% confidence a difference of 10 millibets per First Man-Machine Poker Championship [Johanson, 2007, p. 82],. “Orange” is a strategy for an abstract non-zero-sum Since the goal of the game is to maximize the exploita- poker game where the winner gets 7% more than usual, tion of one’s opponent, the game emphasizes the role while the loser pays the normal price. When this strategy of exploitive strategies as opposed to equilibrium strate- is used to play the normal (still abstract) zero-sum game gies. In the two most recent years of the AAAI Computer of poker, it is exploitable for 28 millibets per game. This Poker Competition, the “Bankroll” event which rewards value is the upper bound on the performance obtainable by exploitive play has been won by agents that lost to some op- any counter-strategy that plays in the same abstraction.
ponents, but won enough money from the weakest agents to In this paper, we will also refer to an agent called have the highest total winnings. However, many of the top “Probe” [Johanson et al., 2008]. Probe is a trivial agent agents have been designed to take advantage of a suspected that never folds, and calls and raises whenever legal with a priori weakness common to many opponents. A more equal probability. The Probe agent is useful for collecting promising approach is to observe an opponent playing for observations about an opponent’s strategy, since it forces some fixed number of games, and use these observations them into all of the parts of the game tree that the opponent to create a counter-strategy that exploits the opponent for more money than a baseline Nash equilibrium strategy or astrategy that exploits some expected weaknesses.
strategy can simply be encoded as a strategy itself. Even a posterior belief derived from a complicated prior and many 9.17 × 1017 game states; computing best responses and observations still can be summarized as a single function mapping an information set to a distribution over actions, we can plot any counter-strategy as a point on a graph with the expected posterior strategy1. In this work, we will these axes. Restricted Nash responses involve a family of mainly take a frequentist approach to observations of the counter-strategies attained by varying p. Hence, we plot opponent’s actions (although we discuss a Bayesian inter- a curve passing through a set of representative p-values to pretation to our approach in Section 7). Each observation demonstrate the shape of the envelope of strategies. Since is one full information game of poker: both players’ cards the exploitability is determined by the choice of p, we are revealed. The model of our opponent will consider all are (indirectly) controlling the exploitability of the result- of the information sets in which we have observed the op- ing counter-strategy, and so it appears on the x-axis; the ponent acting. The probability of the opponent model tak- counter-strategy’s exploitation of the specific opponent is ing an action a in such an information set I is then set to the result, and is shown on the y-axis. In each of the fol- the ratio of the number of observations of the opponent lowing graphs, the values of p used were 0, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, playing a in I to the number of observations of I. There 0.9, 0.93, 0.97, 0.99, and 1. Each value of p corresponds will likely be information sets in which we have never ob- to one datapoint on each curve. Unless otherwise stated, served the opponent acting. For such information sets, we each set of counter-strategies was produced with 1 million establish a default policy to always choose the call ac- observed games of Orange playing against Probe.
Since our opponent model is itself a strategy, it can be Restricted Nash response counter-strategies can over- used to play against the counter-strategies that are de- Nash response counter-strategies each present a different strategies to perform very well in such cases, and this is tradeoff of exploitation and exploitability when compared demonstrated in our previous work on restricted Nash re- against their opponent model. As p increases, the counter- sponses [Johanson et al., 2008]. However, since the model strategies exploit the opponent model to a higher degree, is constructed only from (possibly a small number) obser- and are themselves more exploitable. However, as Fig- vations of the opponent’s strategy, it is more interesting to ure 1a shows, this trend does not hold when we compare examine how the counter-strategies perform against the ac- their performance against the actual opponent instead of the opponent model. As p increases, the counter-strategiesbegin to do markedly worse against the actual Orange strat-egy. The computed counter-strategy has overfit to the op- ponent model. As the number of observations approach thelimit, the opponent model will perfectly match the actual As discussed in the introduction, restricted Nash response opponent in the reachable part of the game tree, and this counter-strategies form an envelope of possible counter- effect will lessen. In a practical setting, however, p must strategies to use against the opponent, assuming the op- be chosen with care so that the resulting counter-strategies ponent model is correct [Johanson et al., 2008]. The re- stricted Nash response technique was designed to solve thebrittleness of best response strategies. As was presented Restricted Nash response counter-strategies require a in Table 1 of that work, best response strategies perform well against their intended opponent, but they can per- technique is given more observations of an opponent, the form very badly against other opponents, and are highly counter-strategies produced will grow in strength. This is exploitable by a worst-case opponent. Restricted Nash re- true of the restricted Nash response technique. However, if sponse strategies are robust, and any new technique for pro- there is not a sufficient quantity of observations, increasing ducing counter-strategies should also be able to produce ro- p can make the resulting counter-strategies worse than the bust strategies. However, restricted Nash response strate- equilibrium strategy. This is another aspect of the restricted gies have three limitations. We will show that our new Nash response technique’s capacity to overfit the model; counter-strategy technique addresses these issues.
if there is an insufficient number of observations, then the default policy plays a larger part of the model’s strategy and the exploitability-versus-exploitation graph that is used the resulting counter-strategy is less applicable to the actual throughout the paper. For each counter-strategy, we can opponent. Figure 1b shows this effect. With less than 100 measure the exploitability (worst-case performance) and thousand observed games, increasing p causes the counter- exploitation (performance against a specific opponent). So strategies to be both more exploitable and less exploitive.
is the posterior density function over strate- gies, then the expected posterior strategy chooses action a at infor- Restricted Nash response counter-strategies are sensi- tive to the choice of training opponent.
2Alternative default policies were tried in this previous work, nique for creating counter-strategies based on observations should be able to accept any reasonably diverse set of ob- servations as input. However, the restricted Nash response technique requires a very particular set of observations in order to perform well. Figure 1c shows the performance of two sets of restricted Nash response counter-strategies. The set labelled Probe uses an opponent model that observed one million games of Orange playing against Probe; the set labelled Self-Play uses an opponent model that observed one million games of Orange playing against itself. One might think that a model constructed from self-play obser- vations would be ideal, because it would be accurate in the parts of the game tree that the opponent is likely to reach.
Instead, we find that self-play data is of no use when con- structing a restricted Nash response counter-strategy. If an agent will not play to reach some part of the game tree, then the opponent model has no observations of the opponent inthat part of the tree, and is forced to turn to the default policy which may be very dissimilar from the actual oppo-nent’s strategy. The Probe agent forces the the opponent to play into all of the parts of the tree reachable because of the opponent’s strategy, however, and thus the default policy isused less often.
The guiding idea behind the restricted Nash response tech- nique is that the opponent model may not be perfect. The parameter p can be thought of as a measure of confidence in the model’s accuracy. Since the opponent model is based on observations of the opponent’s actions, there can be twotypes of flaws in the opponent model. First, there may be information sets in which we never observed the opponent,and so the opponent model must provide a default policy to be taken at this information set. Second, in information sets for which there were a small number of observations,the observed frequency of actions may not match the true We claim that the restricted Nash response technique’s se- lection of one parameter, p, is not an accurate representa-tion of the problem, because the accuracy of the opponent model is not uniform across all of the reachable informa- tion sets. Consider the two cases described above. First, in unobserved information sets, the opponent model uses the default policy and is unlikely to accurately reflect theopponent’s strategy. If we could select a value of p for just this information set, then p would be 0. Second, the num- ber of observations of a particular information set will vary Figure 1: Exploitation versus exploitability curves that il- wildly across the game tree. In information sets close to lustrate three problems in the restricted Nash response tech- the root, we are likely to have many observations, and so nique. In 1a, we note the difference in performance when we expect the model to be accurate. In information sets counter-strategies play against the opponent model and that are far from the root, we will tend to have fewer ob- against the actual opponent. In 1b, we see how a scarcity servations, and so we expect the model to be less accurate.
of observations results in poor counter-strategies. In 1c, we If we were selecting a value of p for one information set, see that the technique performs poorly when self-play data it should depend on how accurate we expect the model to is used. Note that the red, solid curve is the same in each be; one measure of this is the number of times we have observed the opponent acting in this information set.
This is the essential difference between the restricted Nash fashion to p in the restricted Nash response technique. It response technique and the data biased response technique.
is used to set a maximum confidence for Pconf . Varying Instead of choosing one probability p that reflects the ac- Pmax in the range [0, 1] allows us to set a tradeoff between curacy of the entire opponent model, we will assign one exploitation and exploitability, while nI indicates places probability to each information set I and call this mapping where our opponent model should not be trusted.
Pconf . We will then create a modified game in the follow-ing way. Whenever the restricted player reaches I, they will be forced to play according to the model with probability ple choice of Pconf , which we call the 1-Step function. In Pconf (I), and can choose their actions freely with probabil- information sets where we have never observed the op- ity (1 − Pconf (I)). The other player has no restrictions on ponent, Pconf returns 0; otherwise, it returns Pmax. This their actions. When we solve this modified game, the unre- choice of Pconf allows us to isolate the modelling error stricted player’s strategy becomes a robust counter-strategy caused by the default policy from the error caused by the opponent model’s action probabilities not matching the ac-tion probabilities of the actual opponent.
One setting for Pconf is noteworthy. If Pconf (I) is set to0 for some information sets, then the opponent model isnot used at all and the player is free to use any strategy.
However, since we are solving the game, this means that other simple choice of Pconf , which we call the 10-Step we assume a worst-case opponent and essentially compute function. In information sets where we have observed the a Nash equilibrium in these subgames.
opponent fewer than 10 times, Pconf returns 0; otherwise,it returns Pmax. Thus, it is simply a step function that re-quires ten observations before expressing any confidence in Given an opponent model σfix and Pconf , the restrictedplayer chooses a strategy σ dle ground between our two step functions. The 0-10 Lin- 2. The resulting probability of σ2 taking action a at information set I is given as: ear function returns Pmax if nI > 10 and (nI × Pmax)/10 otherwise. Thus, as we obtain more observations, the func- 2(I , a) = Pconf (I )×σfix(I , a)+(1−Pconf (I ))×σ (I , a) tion expresses more confidence in the accuracy of the op-ponent model.
Define ΣPconf ,σfix to be the set of strategies for the restricted player, given the possible settings of σ2. Among this set of strategies, we can define the subset of best responses to ting of Pconf with a Bayesian interpretation. The s-Curve an opponent strategy σ1, BRPconf,σfix (σ1) ⊆ ΣPconf,σfix .
function returns Pmax × (nI /(s + nI )) for any constant Solving a game with the opponent restricted accordingly, s; in this experiment, we used s = 1. Thus, as we ob- tain more observations, the function approaches Pmax. The foundation for this choice of Pconf is explained further in In this pair, the strategy σ∗1 is a Pconf -restricted Nash re- sponse to the opponent model σfix, which we call a databiased response counter-strategy.
In Section 3, we presented three problems with restricted We will now present four ways in which Pconf can be cho- Nash response strategies. In this section, we will revisit sen, all of which have two aspects in common. First, each these three problems and show that data biased response approach sets Pconf (I) for an information set I as a func- counter-strategies overcome these weaknesses. In each ex- tion of the number of observations we have of the opponent periment, the sets of restricted Nash response and data bi- acting in information set I, nI . As the number of observa- ased response counter-strategies were created with p and tions of our opponent acting in I increase, we will become Pmax (respectively) parameters of 0, 0.5, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.93, more confident in the model’s accuracy. If nI = 0, then we 0.97, 0.99, and 1. Unless otherwise stated, each set of set Pconf (I) to zero, indicating that we have no confidence counter-strategies was produced with 1 million observed in the model’s prediction. Note that this choice in setting games of Orange playing against Probe.
Pconf removes the need for a default policy. As mentionedin Section 5, this means the restricted player will become a worst-case opponent in any information sets for which we overfitting to the model. Figure 2a shows the results of have no observations. Second, each approach accepts an sets of restricted Nash response and 1-Step, 10-Step and additional parameter Pmax ∈ [0, 1], which acts in a similar 0-1 Linear data biased response counter-strategies playing against Orange and the opponent model of Orange. Two of the results are noteworthy. First, we observe that the set of 1-Step data biased response counter-strategies overfit the model. Since the 1-Step data biased response counter- strategies did not use the default policy, this shows us that the error caused by the opponent model’s action probabil-ities not agreeing with the actual opponent’s action proba- bilities is a nontrivial problem and that the default policyis not the only weakness. Second, we notice that the 0-10 Linear, 10-Step and 1-Curve data biased response counter-strategies do not overfit the opponent model, even at the last datapoint where Pmax is set to 1.
lem of the quantity of observations necessary to produceuseful counter-strategies. In Figure 1b, we showed that with insufficient quantities of observations, restricted Nash counter-strategies not only did not exploit the opponent but in fact performed worse than a Nash equilibrium strategy (which makes no attempt to exploit the opponent). In Fig-ure 2b, we show that the 0-10 Linear data biased response counter-strategies perform well, regardless of the quantity of observations provided. While the improvement in ex- ploitation from having 100 or 1000 observations is very small, for Pmax < 1 the counter-strategies became only marginally more exploitable. This is a marked difference from the restricted Nash response results in Figure 1b.
lem of the source of the observations used to create themodel. In Figure 1c, we showed that the restricted Nash response technique required observations of the opponentplaying against an opponent such as Probe in order to create useful counter-strategies. In Figure 2c, we show that while the data biased response counter-strategies pro- duced are more effective when the opponent model ob- serves games against Probe, the technique does still pro- duce useful counter-strategies when provided with self- We motivated data biased responses by noting that the con- fidence in our model is not uniform over all information sets, and suggesting p should be some increasing function Figure 2: Exploitation versus exploitability curves for data of the number of observations at a particular information biased response counter-strategies. 2a shows that restricted set. We can give an alternative motivation for this approach Nash and 1-Step counter-strategies overfit the model, while by considering the framework of Bayesian decision mak- 10-Step, 0-10 Linear, and 1-Curve counter-strategies do ing. In the Bayesian framework we choose a prior den- not. 2b shows that the 0-10 Linear counter-strategies are effective with any quantity of training data. 2c shows that strategy. Given observations of the opponent’s decisions the 0-10 Linear counter-strategies can accept any type of Z we can talk about the posterior probability Pr(σ2|Z, f ).
training data. Note that the red, solid curve is the same in If only one more hand is to be played, decision theory in- structs us to maximize our expected utility given our be- The problem of exploiting information about a suspected tendency in an environment while minimizing worst-case Since utility is linear in the sequence form representation of performance occurs in several domains, and becomes more strategy, we can move the integral inside the utility function difficult when the information may be limited or inaccurate.
allowing us to solve the optimization as the best-response We reviewed restricted Nash response counter-strategies, a to the expected posterior strategy (see Footnote 1).
recent work on the opponent modelling interpretation of However, instead of choosing a single prior density, sup- this problem in the Poker domain, and highlighted three pose we choose a set of priors (F ), and we want to play shortcomings in that approach. We proposed a new tech- a strategy that would have large utility for anything in this nique, data biased responses, for generating robust counter- set. A traditional Bayesian approach might require us to strategies that provide good compromises between exploit- specify our uncertainty over priors from this set, and then ing a tendency and limiting the worst case exploitability maximize expected utility given such a hierarchical prior.
of the resulting counter-strategy. We demonstrated that the Suppose, though, that we have no basis for specifying such new technique avoids the three shortcomings of existing a distribution over distributions. An alternative then is to approaches, while providing better performance in the most favourable conditions for the existing approaches.
In other words, employ a strategy that is robust to the We would like to thank the members of the University of choice of prior. Notice that if F contains a singleton prior, Alberta Computer Poker Research Group. This research this optimization is equivalent to the original decision the- oretic approach, i.e., a best response strategy. If F con-tains all possible prior distributions, then the optimizationis identical to the game theoretic approach, i.e., a Nash equilibrium strategy. Other choices of the set F admit op-timizations that trade-off exploiting data with avoiding ex- [Gilpin and Sandholm, 2006] A. Gilpin and T. Sandholm. Find- ing equilibria in large sequential games of imperfect informa- tion. In ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, 2006.
Theorem 1 Consider F to be the set of priors composed M. Bowling. Computing robust counter-strategies. In Neural of independent Dirichlet distributions for each information Information Processing Systems 21, 2008.
set, where the strength (sum of the Dirichlet parameters) isat most s. The strategy computed by data biased response [Johanson, 2007] M. Johanson. Robust strategies and counter- strategies: Building a champion level computer poker player, conf (I ) = nI /(s + nI ) is the solution to the opti- [McCracken and Bowling, 2004] Peter McCracken and Michael Bowling. Safe strategies for agent modelling in games. In ROOF. (Sketch) If we let Σs2 be the set of resulting ex- AAAI Fall Symposium on Artificial Multi-agent Learning, Oc- pected posterior strategies for all choices of priors f ∈ F .
It suffices to show that Σs = ΣPconf ,σfix [Zinkevich and Littman, 2006] M. Zinkevich and M. Littman.
The AAAI computer poker competition. Journal of the Inter- a at information set I. Let σfix(I, a) = αf / national Computer Games Association, 29, 2006. News item.
in other words the strategy where the opponent plays theexpected prior strategy when given the opportunity. The [Zinkevich et al., 2008] M. Zinkevich, M. Johanson, M. Bowl- ing, and C. Piccione. Regret minimization in games with in- resulting expected posterior strategy is the the same as σ2 complete information. In Neural Information Processing Sys- from Equation 1 and so is in the set ΣPconf ,σfix . Similarly, given σfix associated with a strategy σ2 in ΣPconf,σfix , letαI,a = sσfix(I, a). The resulting expected posterior strat-egy is the same as σ2. The available strategies to player 2are equivalent, and so the resulting min-max optimizationsare equivalent.
In summary, we can choose Pconf in data biased responseso that it is equivalent to finding strategies that are robustto a set of independent Dirichlet priors.

Source: http://poker.cs.ualberta.ca/publications/AISTATS09.pdf

2012.04.12 cenkos news technology

Cenkos News 13th April 2012 The Technology Theme: An Introduction What do we mean by technology and why is it a long term theme? Technology is often defined as: “ the application of scientific knowledge for practical purposes ”. While information technology largely dominates this field in our (President of the Michigan Savings Bank advising Henry Ford’s ti

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CLINICIAN’S CORNER The Seventh Report of the Joint National Committee on Prevention, Detection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure The JNC 7 Report “The Seventh Report of the Joint National Committee on Prevention, De- tection, Evaluation, and Treatment of High Blood Pressure” provides a new guideline for hypertension prevention and management. The following are

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